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ABSTRACT 
We contribute to the current regulatory debate by examining the wealth and risk effects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act on U.S. financial institutions. We measure the effects of key legislative events 
of the Act by means of a multivariate regression model using the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) framework. Our results indicate a mixed reaction by financial institutions during the 
various stages of the Act’s legislative process. Further tests reveal that any positive reactions are 
driven by small and/or low risk institutions, while negative ones are consistent across subsets; 
except for investment banks. We also find market risk increases for most financial institutions 
that are dominated by small and/or low risk institutions. The cross-section results reveal that 
large institutions fare better than their smaller counterparts and that large investment banks gain 
value at the expense of others. Overall, the Dodd-Frank Act may have redistributed value among 
financial institutions, while not necessarily reducing the industry’s riskiness. 
 
JEL classification: G21; G22; G32; G34 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, globalization, technological advances and increased competition 
fuelled an intense phase of consolidation in the financial services industry that resulted in the 
formation of universal banks and financial conglomerates
1
. These hybrid institutions come as a 
result of key regulatory reforms such as the U.S. Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) 
of 1999 and the EU Second Banking Directive (SBD) of 1989. These reforms removed 
restrictions on Bank Holding Company (BHC) activities and, thus, paved the way for cross-
sector integration in the financial services arena via mergers and acquisitions (Elyasiani et al., 
2016). 
The recent financial crisis has caused renewed concerns regarding the effects of bank 
diversification on financial stability. In a global coordinated fashion, authorities have put 
together a number of regulatory initiatives. When developing these initiatives, the Financial 
Stability Forum (2008), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), and the Council of 
the European Union (2008) refer to transparency and rely to some extent on the disciplinary role 
of markets (Praet and Nguyen, 2008). In the aftermath of the crisis, a number of regulatory 
reforms have been introduced, such as Basel III, the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) of 2010 in the U.S., 
and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013 in the UK, whereas a set of proposals 
for the European Union were released by the European Commission in 2014. In particular, Basel 
III delivers a set of reform measures aiming to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and risk 
management of the banking sector. The DFA (formally, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act) implements the Volcker rule, which forbids the co-existence of 
                                                 
1
 This paper adopts the definition of financial conglomerates/universal banks provided by Vander Vennet (2002). A 
similar definition is used by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates. 
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predefined investment banking activities in different subsidiaries within the same banking group. 
The Banking Reform Act of 2013 implements the Vickers proposals, allowing for 
subsidiarization of investment activities in separately capitalised legal entities. In January 2014, 
the European Commission published its proposal for a ‘Volcker-Vickers style’ reform, which 
deviates somewhat from the recommendations of the Liikanen report of 2012.
2
 Though different 
in their approaches to achieve functional separation between commercial and investment 
banking, these reforms are based on the premise that bank diversification into non-banking, and, 
specifically, banks’ securities activities have a negative impact on financial stability. 
The merits of bank diversification have long been debated by academics and regulators. At 
the theoretical level, proponents contend that financial conglomerates a) benefit from cost, 
revenue, and operational synergies (Saunders and Walter, 1994; Vander Vennet, 2002), b) have 
less volatile profit streams through the coinsurance effect (Boot and Schmeits, 2000), c) exhibit 
superior resource allocation through effective internal markets (Stein, 1997), d) have lower 
bankruptcy risk due to revenue diversification (Benston, 1994; Saunders, 1994), and e) can adapt 
more easily to changing economic conditions, due to their diversity (Herring and Santomero, 
1990). At the public policy level, large financial conglomerates may be able to extract benefits 
associated with their increased market power, wider political influence and greater access to the 
safety net (Kane, 2000). 
On the other hand, opponents argue that bank diversification propagates risk and increases 
social costs (Black, et al., 1978), and leads to conflicts of interest, allocative distortions, 
concentration of power, expansion of the safety net, and inefficiencies (Flannery, 1999; Herring 
and Santomero, 1990; Santomero and Eckles, 2000). Others argue that although it might reduce 
                                                 
2
 For details on these reforms, the interested reader is referred to Mayer Brown (2014). 
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firm-specific risk, it exacerbates systemic risk due to the increased interconnectedness among 
financial institutions (Acharya, 2009; Ibragimov et al., 2011; Wagner, 2010). Herring and 
Santomero (1990) highlight the importance of the potential market impact of the failure of large 
and complex financial institutions, the greater cost of supervising them, and the moral hazard 
issues associated with the access of nonbanks to the safety net. Similarly, Santomero and Eckles 
(2000) highlight the social costs related to reduced competition, reduced consumer choices, and 
conflicts of interest; whereas, Kane (2000) argues that the largest banks tend to reap most 
benefits due to their market power, political influence and their greater access to the safety net. 
The empirical evidence is also largely inconclusive.
3
 One strand looks into the effects of bank 
acquisitions of nonbanks on the risk and returns of financial institutions. For example, Fields et 
al. (2007) find no evidence of risk changes when banks acquire insurance companies, while 
Elyasiani et al. (2016) report a decline in risk for bank acquirers and their peers. In contrast, 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) show that low-risk European banks diversifying into 
nonbanking activities experience a marked increase in default risk. Casu et al. (2016) find that 
bank combinations with securities firms yield higher risks than combinations with insurance 
companies, yet provide evidence that size may be responsible, as opposed to diversification per 
se. Similarly, Weiß et al. (2014) find an increase in systemic risk following M&A activity that is 
not associated with income diversification, but related to managerial hubris and the existence of 
deposit insurance guarantees. This is corroborated in Molyneux et al. (2014), who find that 
safety net subsidies derived from M&A are positively associated with rescue probability. 
Another strand looks into the relationship between measures of bank diversification, 
performance and risk. For example, Stiroh (2004) finds diversification is associated with more 
                                                 
3
 We refer the interested reader to Casu et al. (2016) for a more detailed discussion of the bank diversification 
literature.  
 5 
 
volatile and lower risk-adjusted returns at banks, while Stiroh (2006), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
and Mercieca et al. (2007) find that diversification benefits are offset by the greater exposure to 
more volatile activities. Baele et al. (2007) find that while bank diversification reduces 
idiosyncratic and total risks, it increases systematic risk. Finally, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and 
De Jonghe (2010) report a positive relationship between banks’ non-interest income and 
systemic risk. 
We argue that recent banking reforms are based on inconclusive evidence on the effects of 
bank diversification into non-banking. Entering another round of re-regulation may be 
ineffective as institutions will figure out how to circumvent rules (Kane, 1988). New regulations 
might introduce unnecessary costs to financial institutions, the taxpayer and the consumer, with 
no guarantees that they will succeed in their objectives. In addition, consistent with contestable 
markets theory (Baumol, 1982), these reforms might shift economic rents from commercial 
banks to other financial institutions – the latter benefiting from reduced competition, thus 
altering the industry’s competitive landscape. The above may ignite regulatory arbitrage, 
whereby affected banks relocate their activities to less regulated geographical locations, which, 
in turn, can reduce tax revenues, lead to job reductions and impact on economic activity. We 
draw evidence in support of these theoretical arguments from a strand of literature that examines 
the effects of regulatory changes on the wealth and/or risk of FIs. In particular, Carow (2001) 
reports positive excess returns around court rulings allowing banks to sell annuities. Others, 
examine the market reaction to the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999 and 
generally point to positive wealth effects for insurers (Carow and Heron, 2002; Hendershott et 
al., 2002; Neale and Peterson, 2005), except for Yildirim et al. (2006), who report positive 
wealth effects and risk reductions for all FIs. Consistent with these studies, Carow and Kane’s 
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(2002) survey concludes that the relaxation of long-standing restrictions on the U.S. FIs may 
have redistributed, rather than created, value. 
A limited number of recent studies attempt to gauge the impact of the DFA on the wealth 
and/or risk of U.S. FIs, yet offer inconclusive results. For example, Gao et al. (2013) report 
negative (positive) excess (bond) returns for a sample of 45 systemically important institutions, 
and conclude that the market expects the DFA to reduce FI risk taking. In contrast, Turk and 
Swicegood (2012) use a sample of banks and report positive excess returns that are mainly 
driven by large institutions. Elsewhere, Akhigbe et al. (2016) report risk reductions for a large 
sample of FIs, with the exception of market beta increases when shorter event windows are 
considered. One potential issue with the above studies is the aggregated reporting of excess 
returns and/or risk changes across a) different bank types and BHCs (Turk and Swicegood, 
2012), and b) depository and non-depository institutions (Akhigbe et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2013). 
To the extent that the DFA’s provisions exert differential effects across different types of FIs – 
potentially altering the competitive landscape of the industry (Baumol, 1982) – sample over-
aggregation may realize a loss of sector specific information and, thus, provides an incomplete 
picture of the DFA’s implications. Fier and Liebenberg (2013) overcome this potential issue by 
focusing solely on the insurance industry. They report negative excess returns for insurance 
companies, which they attribute to regulatory uncertainty. Nevertheless, their study does not 
control for the problem of cross-sectional correlations among the stock returns of the various 
firms examined. 
This paper contributes to the literature and to the current regulatory debate in a number of 
ways: First, it extends previous work on the DFA, while overcoming the potential issues related 
to the aggregation of results across different types of FIs. Specifically, the paper examines the 
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wealth and risk effects of the DFA across distinct groups of U.S. FIs
4
, and thus offering a better 
understanding of the impact of the Act on the financial services industry. Second, it offers 
broader results by assessing the presence of any differential effects based on the institutions’ size 
and risk profile. Third, it examines the presence of cross-sectional variations in wealth and risk 
effects caused by institutional characteristics, such as industry type, profitability, leverage, 
operating efficiency, growth opportunities, distance to default, and size. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study embracing all these elements using a diverse sample of FIs. 
In what follows, Section 2 provides an overview of the evolution of the U.S. regulatory 
environment, analyses the DFA, and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 summarizes our event 
identification and sample selection processes, as well as presents the methodology employed. 
Section 4 provides a discussion of the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.  
2. Regulatory landscape and hypotheses 
The majority of the legislative barriers between banks and non-bank financial companies were 
imposed by Section 24 of the National Banking Act of 1864. That is, banks were permitted to 
exercise “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking”. 
As such, all the activities that were considered as ‘non-incidental’ to banking were prohibited. In 
the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, forty percent of the banks had either failed or been 
forced to merge (Benston, 1990). Banks were considered to be the culprits of the financial 
turmoil because they were engaging in speculative activities through their securities subsidiaries 
                                                 
4
 The focus is on the U.S. since it was the first market to introduce reforms and it is well represented by large and 
diversified financial institutions. In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crisis, it was widely anticipated that the U.S. 
Congress would consider bills to reform the financial sector. One might argue that any expectations would have 
been discounted in the market and, hence, question the validity of any empirical exercise. Following the rationale 
provided in Carow and Heron (2002), this paper focuses on the extent to which the DFA’s legislative process 
resolved uncertainties regarding the details of the Act, as well as updated expectations with respect to the probability 
that the Act would be signed into law. It is also worth noting that the results in this study reflect the stock market's 
perceptions regarding the impact of the DFA on FIs. 
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(Flannery, 1985).
5
 Some studies, however, suggest that the concerns in the aftermath of the crash 
were unfounded (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Puri, 1994), while Ang and Richardson (1994) 
argue that the bad underwriting practices of two banks may have condemned the industry. 
The Banking Act of 1933 (Section 20) opted to reintroduce stabilisation and public trust in the 
financial system by prohibiting commercial banks from affiliating with companies that were 
“principally engaged” in the issue, flotation, underwriting, sale or distribution of securities.6 The 
establishment of BHCs, however, allowed banks to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the 
aforementioned Acts. BHCs were not explicitly forbidden to own a commercial bank, investment 
bank or insurance company. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 closed this loophole by 
confining holding company affiliates to activities that were “closely related to banking”. 
Although these pieces of legislation were introduced to safeguard the financial system, it is 
worth noting that at the time when players in other industries were consolidating at a torrid pace, 
the financial services industry remained fragmented. During the following years, competitive 
pressures increased the need for consolidation in the financial services arena. Financial 
companies started to press regulators to eliminate most of the barriers that hampered their efforts 
to consolidate. As a result, the majority of the barriers, imposed by the previous Acts, were 
removed by the FSMA of 1999. Under the FSMA, banks could affiliate with investment banks, 
insurers and securities firms through a holding company structure. What is more, the passage of 
the Act targeted one of the anomalies observed, whereby, commercial banks were allowed to 
acquire investment banks and insurance companies, whereas the opposite was not permitted. The 
                                                 
5
 The Senate Banking and Currency Committee (SBCC) undertook an investigation into the role of large banks and 
securities firms. In 1933, SBCC counsel Ferdinand Pecora documented a considerable number of ill practices 
between these institutions and their customers that took place prior to the crisis. 
6
 Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act (1933) are designated as the Glass-Steagall Act. 
 9 
 
FSMA also consolidated the supervision of BHCs, with the Federal Reserve being the ‘umbrella’ 
regulator and the Securities and Exchange Commission regulating the banks’ securities activities. 
The financial meltdown in 2007-2009 triggered another round of regulatory debates. Once 
again, the consensus that banks’ securities activities were the main contributor to the crisis has 
dominated these debates. As a result, the U.S. government introduced the DFA aiming to 
alleviate systemic risk, end implicit guarantees and, ultimately, promote better market discipline 
(Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2014).
7
 The Act attempts to deal with financial institutions in the 
following ways.
8
 
First, commercial banks are subject to heavy restrictions on securities activities, and face 
limits on asset securitization and on the issuance of excess credit to mortgage loan borrowers 
(Sanders, 2013). In particular, the Act bans banks from proprietary trading (subject to certain 
exceptions), which will have an impact on their profitability. In addition, it limits bank 
investment in (or sponsorship of) hedge funds and private equity funds to no more than 3% of 
their equity. Banks will be forced to divest impermissible ownership interests and, thus, face 
additional costs, experience reduced income streams, and lose any related diversification 
benefits. Moreover, the Act requires that securitizers and collateral originators retain a minimum 
economic interest in the related Asset Backed Securities (ABS).
9
 This is likely to increase banks’ 
                                                 
7
 To address these issues, the Act establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Office of 
Financial Research (OFR). The FSOC aims to (a) identify financial institutions capable of creating systemic risk, (b) 
shield taxpayers from SIFI losses, and (c) to deal with threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system. The FSOC 
relies on the judgement of a panel chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and whose membership comprises the 
heads of the various financial regulatory bodies. The OFR’s primary role is to provide technical assistance by 
collecting and analysing data on systemic risk. 
8
 The DFA is a very comprehensive structural reform, influencing nearly all financial market participants and 
financial institutions nationally and internationally. To better address the key objectives of this article, the focus here 
is placed on the parts of the Act, which might have a direct impact on the different types of U.S. financial 
institutions. The interested reader is referred to Acharya et al. (2010) for a detailed analysis and evaluation of the 
DFA; Krainer (2012) offers a review of Acharya’s et al. (2010) work. 
9
 This provision is informally known as “skin in the game”. It obliges originators and ABS securitizers to retain an 
unhedged economic interest of “not less than 5% of the credit risk” for any securitized asset. 
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credit risk and/or affect their profitability. Banks also face an increased cost of securitization, 
given enhanced disclosure requirements for information concerning the underlying assets and the 
analysis of their quality. The new lending limit includes the credit exposure from derivative 
transactions; this reduces the amount of lending from banks and lowers the profit from lending 
activities. For larger commercial banks and savings institutions, the Act introduces stronger rules 
for the requirements on capital, leverage, liquidity, risk management, and systemic risk imposed 
to the financial systems. These new rules are likely to introduce additional costs and further cut 
into bank profits. The aforementioned discussion can form the basis for the following set of null 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Commercial banks’ wealth and risk remain unaffected by the passage of the 
DFA. 
Hypothesis 2:  Savings banks’ wealth and risk remain unaffected by the passage of the DFA. 
 
Second, the effect of the DFA on investment banks can be either positive or negative. Larger 
and systemically important institutions are now regulated by the Federal Reserve due to their 
potential impact on the wider economy. In addition, the DFA introduces stricter rules on the risk-
taking practices in OTC derivatives.
10
 Such actions may reduce profits in investment banking.  
Nonetheless, the Volcker Rule should improve their competitive position (especially for large 
institutions) in proprietary trading activities, asset management as well as investments in private 
equity and hedge funds. The above can form the basis for the following null hypothesis:  
 
                                                 
10
 These activities are now monitored by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC). 
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Hypothesis 3:  Investment banks’ wealth and risk remain unaffected by the passage of the DFA. 
 
Finally, the DFA has limited coverage in finance companies and insurance companies. It 
establishes the new Federal Insurance Office (FIO), which has the responsibility to gather 
information about the insurance industry and assigns the regulation of systemically important 
insurers to the Federal Reserve. Thus, the following null hypothesis can be assumed: 
  
Hypothesis 4:  Finance and insurance companies’ wealth and risk remain unaffected by the 
passage of the DFA. 
 
Finally, the existing literature on FI regulation documents that wealth and/or risk effects vary 
with institutional characteristics, such as their type and size. These variations are typically 
caused by regulatory-driven shifts in the FIs competitive environment, thereby creating winners 
and losers during the process of institutional adjustment to the new rules. As noted previously, 
the DFA introduces rules that are likely to exert differential effects to different sectors of the 
financial services industry. Regardless of sectoral differences, the process of institutional 
adjustment to the new regulatory regime is also likely to be driven by institutional 
characteristics. The above can form the basis for the following null hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The wealth and risk effects of FIs do not vary based on the type of institution 
and/or firm characteristics. 
 
 12 
 
3. Legislative dates, sample and methodology 
3.1. Legislative dates and sample selection 
Our analysis focuses on the equity reaction (risk and return) of U.S. financial firms around 
key legislative events leading to the passage of the DFA. We extract the list of major 
congressional actions on the DFA from the THOMAS database of the Library of Congress.
11
 The 
date the Conference Committee began reconciling the House and Senate versions of the Bill 
(June 25, 2010), as well as the date Senator Scott Brown backed the Act (July 12, 2010), are also 
included, as these events might have conveyed information to the market regarding the details of 
the Act, and/or partially removed uncertainty regarding its passage. Table 1 presents a list of the 
events. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Using Bloomberg, the financial institutions traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
the American Stock Exchange (ASE) or NASDAQ, are grouped on the basis of the standard 
industrial classification (SIC) system. Sample firms must have continuous daily equity returns 
from June 12, 2009 to January 11, 2011 and trade at least 70% of the time. This amounts to 400 
trading days, allowing for 120-trading days before and 120-trading days after the legislative 
process
12
 to test for shifts in risk following the day the Act was passed into law. The sample 
consists 360 financial institutions; specifically, 67 national commercial banks (SIC 6021), 92 
state commercial banks (SIC 6022), 27 Federal savings institutions (SIC 6035), 8 savings 
institutions – not federally chartered (SIC 6036), 36 finance companies (SIC 61), 4 security 
brokers (SIC 6200), 22 security brokers and dealers (SIC 6211), 18 investment advisors (SIC 
                                                 
11
 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173/actions. Note the THOMAS database was 
retired on July 5, 2016 and replaced by Congress.gov. 
12
 The legislative process involving key events spans 160 trading days, from December 2, 2009 to July 22, 2010. 
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6282), 12 life insurers (SIC 631), 19 health insurers (SIC 632), and 55 P/C insurers (SIC 633).
13
  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Looking at Table 2, a number of observations can be made. In terms of size, national banks 
are larger than all other institutions, with average assets of $134 billion, followed by insurance 
companies and investment banks with average assets of $57 and $54 billion, respectively. State 
banks, savings institutions, and finance firms are much smaller, with average assets between $11 
and $14 billion. In terms of average profitability, all types of banks exhibit negative return on 
equity ratios (ROE – net income-to-total equity). Specifically, the ROE for national banks is -
0.2%, while state banks and savings banks exhibit ratios of -9.7% and -8.4%, respectively. In 
contrast, non-banks exhibit positive ROE ratios with finance firms leading the way (35.6%), 
followed by insurance companies (10.1%) and investment banks (5.1%). Banks and finance 
firms share relatively similar capital structures (LEV – total assets-to-total equity) and have 
higher LEV than insurance companies and investment banks. In terms of the average cost ratio 
(CR - operating expenses-to-total assets), banks and insurance companies exhibit lower 
operational costs than investment banks and finance firms. Looking at the proxy for growth 
opportunities (M/B – market-to-book ratio), the average investment bank trades at around 4 
times its book value, while the respective multiple for all other types of institution is around 1. 
Finally, in terms of average risk (DD – distance to default)14, finance companies, state banks, and 
                                                 
13
 Note we exclude foreign banks (SIC 6029) as they were not the focus of Congress during the DFA’s legislative 
process. In addition, given their limited coverage by the DFA, and to keep results comparable with the wider 
literature on the wealth/risk effects of FI regulation (see Section 1), we also exclude credit unions (SIC 606), 
branches and agencies of foreign banks (SIC 607), functions related to depository banking (SIC 608), security and 
commodity exchanges (SIC 623), insurance agents, brokers and services (SIC 64), and real estate firms (SIC 65). 
14
 For this measure the paper uses the Bloomberg credit risk function. The original concept coined by Merton (1974) 
assumed that zero-coupon debt can default only at maturity. The Bloomberg function overcomes this limitation by 
treating equity as a one-year barrier call option (i.e. that a firm can default prior to maturity) and creating a mapping 
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investment banks are almost two times riskier than national banks, insurance companies, and 
savings banks. 
3.2. Methodology 
To measure the effects of legislative events of the DFA on the equity returns and risk of 
financial intermediaries, the paper employs the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
framework. The SUR approach provides more efficient estimates since it accounts for the cross-
equation residual correlations (Carow and Heron, 2002; Johnston and Madura, 2000; Schipper 
and Thompson, 1985).
15
 The system of n equations, representing the n firms within a sector, is 
estimated separately for each group of FIs. The algebraic representation of the system is as 
follows
16
: 
𝑅1𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾1Δ𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿1,𝑘𝐷𝑘
8
𝑘=1 + 𝜃1𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜆1𝐷𝐴Δ𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡
⋮                                                                                                                                 
  𝑅𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑛Δ𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑛,𝑘𝐷𝑘
8
𝑘=1 + 𝜃𝑛𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜆𝑛𝐷𝐴Δ𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡
  (1)                                                                                                                                
where, 
𝛼𝑖  = the intercept coefficient; 
                                                                                                                                                             
between distance to default (DD) and actual default rates. In addition, Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that while 
DD is a significant predictor of default, it is not a sufficient statistic. Consistent with this study, the Bloomberg 
function supplements the information in DD with sector specific metrics that are related to the credit health of firms 
(i.e. non-performing loans for banks, claims reserves for insurance companies), and thus providing an accurate 
default probability. Technical details can be obtained via the Bloomberg terminal. 
15
 As noted in Bhargava and Fraser (1998), the problem of cross-sectional correlation among residuals is more 
pronounced for industry-wide regulatory changes in the FI industry, given its heavily regulated nature. As regulatory 
changes typically trigger changes in both the risk and returns of FIs, the traditional event study methodology is 
deemed inappropriate. 
16
 To correct for non-synchronous data, we also estimate an alternative model, which incorporates lagged market 
returns and lagged interest rate changes. In addition, for robustness, we also estimate the model using alternative 
market proxies, such as the S&P 500, the MSCI index, and the MSCI Financials index, as well as alternative interest 
rate proxies, such as the change in the 3-month Treasury bill rate, and the change in the 1-month Treasury bill rate. 
The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. We check residual autocorrelations for up to 10 
lags (two trading weeks) to test our specification. Most autocorrelation coefficients are lower than 0.05. 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡  = the logarithmic return on stock i on day t; 
𝑅𝑚𝑡  = the logarithmic return on the NYSE Composite index on day t; 
𝛥𝐼𝑡  = the change in the rate of the U.S. 10-year constant maturity Treasury; 
𝛽𝑖  = the market beta before and during the legislative process; 
𝛾𝑖  = the interest rate coefficient before and during the legislative process; 
𝛿𝑖,𝑘  = the shift in the intercept (abnormal return) due to the legislative event k; 
𝜃𝑖  = the shift in the market beta after the legislative process; 
𝜆𝑖  = the shift in the interest rate coefficient after the legislative process; 
𝐷𝑘  = 
a dummy variable equal to one on the three trading days around the k
th
 regulatory 
event [-1, +1], and zero otherwise; 
𝐷𝐴  = a dummy variable equal to one after the last legislative event and zero otherwise; 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  = the error term with the usual properties 
 
The system can also be generalized using matrix notation as: 
𝑅 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀       (2) 
or 
[
𝑅1𝑡
⋮
𝑅𝑛𝑡
] = [
𝑋 … 0
⋮ … ⋮
0 … 𝑋
] [
𝛽1
⋮
𝛽𝑛
] + [
𝜀1𝑡
⋮
𝜀𝑛𝑡
]     (3) 
 
where,  
𝑅 = (𝑅1𝑡 … 𝑅𝑛𝑡) a 1 × 𝑛 vector; 
𝑋 = a 𝑇 × 𝑁 matrix of explanatory variables; 
𝛽 = a 𝑇 × 1 vector of coefficients; 
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𝜀 = a 𝑇 × 1 vector of residuals 
We expect the average abnormal return 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑘
𝑛
𝑖=1  to be statistically significant if 
legislative event k has a significant impact on the stock prices of each group of FIs. Similarly, we 
expect the risk shift operators ?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and ?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  to be statistically significant if 
there is a significant shift in the market and interest rate sensitivity of each group of FIs, 
following the passage of the DFA. 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1. Excess returns 
4.1.1. Full sample 
The analysis focuses on certain parts of the Act, which are assumed to have a direct impact on 
the U.S. FIs. We anticipate the impact of these regulatory changes to differ across types of 
institutions. Table 3 presents the results of the SUR estimation for the full sample. The first 
column identifies the type of financial institution, while the subsequent columns present 
estimates for each of the events analysed. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The results show that the FIs in our sample exhibited negative and insignificant excess returns 
when the Bill was introduced to the House of Representatives (Event 1), as well as when it was 
passed/agreed to in the House (Event 2). Similar findings are reported in Turk and Swicegood 
(2012) and Fier and Liebenberg (2013) for their sample of banks, and insurance companies, 
respectively. Gao et al. (2013) obtain a negative coefficient on the first event and a positive on 
the second event, yet do not report tests of statistical significance for individual dates. The sign 
tests reveal that the number of FIs exhibiting positive excess returns is significantly lower than 
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the expected (50%), under the null hypothesis; the exceptions are state banks and finance 
companies, when the Bill was passed/agreed to in the House. The finding that a significantly 
higher number of FIs exhibit negative returns may suggest that individual FI characteristics 
could be underlying. Consistent with prior evidence (Fier and Liebenberg, 2013; Gao et al., 
2013; Turk and Swicegood, 2012) we also obtain insignificant results when the Bill was 
passed/agreed to in the Senate (Event 3). The only exception is savings institutions, which 
exhibit a negative and significant excess return of -0.9%. Once again, the signs tests show that 
the number of negative excess returns significantly differs from the expectation of 50% under the 
null hypothesis for all financial institutions, except for investment banks. 
Shifting our attention to the date when the Conference Committee began reconciliation of the 
House and Senate versions of the Bill (Event 4), we observe positive and significant reactions for 
national banks (1.2%), finance companies (0.9%) and insurance companies (0.5%). The result on 
banks is consistent with Turk and Swicegood (2012), yet the magnitude of our reported excess 
return is greater. This difference can be attributed to the fact that they aggregate excess returns 
across national banks, state banks, and savings institutions; our finding of insignificant excess 
returns for the latter two groups lend further support to this argument. One potential explanation 
for the positive reaction by national banks is that the reconciled version of the Bill represented a 
much watered-down version of its predecessors. In particular, industry lobbying led to important 
victories for banks, including the right to retain control of hedge funds and private equity firms, 
and the ability to continue trading most derivatives. As far as finance firms and insurance 
companies are concerned, the positive excess returns could be associated with analogous 
concessions. In particular, finance firms, which are involved in consumer credit, may have 
welcomed exceptions on consumer rules related to automobile financing. Similarly, insurance 
 18 
 
companies avoided a ban on certain risky trading activities. The insignificant reaction by 
investment banks could be due to the fact that larger and more systemic institutions a) would be 
eventually forced to shed part of their substantial hedge funds and private-equity activities, b) are 
likely to face a ban in proprietary trading, as well as c) endure additional oversight of their 
trading activities. Finally, the insignificant reaction by state banks and savings institutions could 
be related to the fact that the majority are small and low risk and, therefore, less affected by the 
Bill, which imposes stronger rules on the capital, leverage, liquidity, risk management, and 
systemic risk of the largest institutions.    
Furthermore, all FIs show insignificant reactions when the Conference report was 
passed/agreed to in the House of Representatives (Event 5), except for investment banks and 
insurance companies that experience a negative and significant cumulative excess return of -
0.9% and -0.6%, respectively. Whilst our result on banks may be consistent
17
 with Gao et al. 
(2013), it is not consistent with Turk and Swicegood (2012) who report a positive and significant 
wealth effect. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, this difference could be attributed to the aggregation 
of excess returns across different types of banks, and/or the inclusion of banks with non-Federal 
or State charter in their study. For investment banks, the negative result could be associated with 
the aforementioned uncertainty regarding their a) involvement in hedge funds and private equity, 
b) proprietary trading activities, and/or c) exposure to increased regulatory oversight. Our result 
on insurance companies, although not consistent with the insignificant coefficient obtained in 
Fier and Liebenberg (2013), could be associated with increased uncertainty regarding the 
selection process for enhanced federal regulation, or the ‘modus operandi’ of the newly formed 
                                                 
17
 Note we use the term ‘may be’ to indicate that although our result on the sign of the excess return is consistent 
with Gao et al. (2013), we are unable to comment on the significance as they do not report statistical tests for 
individual dates. In addition, they report aggregate excess returns for systemically important commercial banks, 
investment banks and insurance companies. 
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FIO and FSOC. Complementing the above results, the sign tests reveal a significant deviation 
from the expectation of equally distributed positive and negative returns for all FIs except 
savings institutions.  
We find no significant reaction by FIs when Senator Scott Brown backed the Bill (Event 6). 
This could be due to the fact that the market already anticipated this development. In contrast, 
our results show that national banks, state banks, and investment banks experience significant 
negative excess returns of -1.5%, -1.4% and -0.6%, respectively, when the Conference report 
was passed/agreed to in the Senate (Event 7). As above, our result on banks may be consistent 
with Gao et al. (2013), but is in contrast with the insignificant coefficient in Turk and Swicegood 
(2012). This negative reaction by commercial and investment banks may be indicative of the 
broader regulatory uncertainty regarding the final shape of the regulatory framework and its 
impact on their activities. Our negative but insignificant result on insurance companies is not 
consistent with Fier and Liebenberg (2013) who find a negative and significant excess return. As 
noted earlier, one potential explanation for this difference is the fact that the traditional event 
study approach in their study does not account for cross-sectional correlations among residuals. 
Finally, the sign tests clearly support this negative reaction by the majority of financial 
institutions in our sample. 
Taking a closer look at the above results, we observe that national and state banks experience 
lower excess returns than investment banks. To the extent that FI reactions on this date reflect 
updated expectations regarding its impact on FIs, this result may indicate that the markets expect 
commercial banks to experience a loss of competitive strength vis-à-vis investment banks. 
Specifically, commercial banks may experience additional costs and reduced profits, as a result 
of DFA imposed restrictions in proprietary trading, and the limits in the ownership (or 
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sponsorship) of hedge funds and private equity funds. It could be argued that although the market 
expects that investment banks will be affected by the stricter rules on the risk-taking practices in 
OTC derivatives, this is partially offset by the benefits accruing from the reduced competition by 
commercial banks. To contextualize this argument, it is likely that commercial banks will scale 
down any impermissible securities activities and/or divest ownership in hedge funds and private 
equity funds to comply with the DFA. In turn, some of these activities might shift to investment 
banks, thus increasing investment in them, and, potentially, leading their returns to higher 
levels.
18
  
Finally, we find no significant abnormal returns around the time the President signed the Bill 
(Event 8), since the market had already discounted the effects of the Act and it is likely investors 
expected it to be signed by the President. 
4.1.2. Sample subsets 
One may argue that FI characteristics, such as their size and risk, may trigger differential 
reactions to the DFA. In what follows, we determine if excess returns vary according to these 
characteristics. To achieve this, we segment the FIs in each subset by size and risk profile (Table 
4).
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[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Looking at the excess returns of national banks across all legislative events, some interesting 
patterns emerge. Specifically, we note a negative and significant excess return of -1.5% for large 
                                                 
18
 The cross-section results in Section 4.3. lend further support to this argument. 
19
 We follow Carow and Heron (2002) and define large (small) FIs as those with total assets greater (lower) than $10 
billion. For robustness, we also use the median value of total assets to segment the sample. The results are 
qualitatively similar and are available upon request. We define high (low) risk institutions as those with an above 
(below) median distance-to-default (DD) figure (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). Note the reduction in the total 
number of institutions for some subsets is due to the unavailability of accounting data. To conserve space, we only 
report figures for events 1, 4, 7 and 8. The remaining events are discussed in the paper, while figures are available 
upon request.  
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national banks (Panel A) when the Bill was introduced to the House (Event 1). In addition, the 
difference between the excess returns of large and small national banks is statistically significant, 
indicating that large institutions exhibit lower excess returns. Although the risk segmentation for 
the same event (Panel B) does not yield significant excess returns for either high risk or low risk 
institutions, the t-statistic indicates that high risk institutions experience significantly lower 
excess returns. In addition, the results show that the previously observed positive excess return 
for national banks when the Conference committee began reconciling the House and Senate 
versions (Event 4) is driven by small (Panel A) and/or low risk (Panel B) national banks. All 
other legislative events yield insignificant coefficients, except for the date when the conference 
report was passed/agreed to in the Senate (Event 7), where both large and small (Panel A) and/or 
high and low risk (Panel B) national banks exhibit negative and significant excess returns.  
Looking at state banks, the results are generally consistent with those reported in Table 3, 
indicating a uniform reaction across large and small institutions (Panel A). The risk segmentation 
(Panel B) produces similar conclusions, except for the date when the Conference committee 
began the reconciliation process (Event 4), with low risk state banks exhibiting positive and 
significant excess returns that are significantly higher than those of high risk state banks. Similar 
observations can be made for savings institutions; the only exception is the negative excess 
return when the Bill was passed/agreed to in the Senate (Event 7), which is driven by small 
institutions (Panel A). Finally, this event produces a uniform reaction by high risk and low risk 
institutions (Panel B). 
The results on finance companies reveal that the full sample’s positive and significant reaction 
when the Conference committee began the reconciliation process (Event 4) is driven by small 
institutions (Panel A), similar to national banks. The segmentation into high risk and low risk 
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finance firms (Panel B) does not yield any significant coefficient on that date. Unlike the full 
sample results, Table 4 indicates that small and/or low risk finance companies also exhibit a 
negative and significant reaction when the Bill was signed by the President (Event 8). 
The results on investment banks show that the two negative and significant reactions observed 
for the full sample are driven by small institutions, with their larger counterparts experiencing 
significantly higher excess returns (Panel A). The risk segmentation (Panel B) shows a uniform 
negative reaction when the Conference report was passed/agreed to in the House (Event 5), 
whereas only high risk investment banks exhibit negative excess returns when the Conference 
report was agreed to in the Senate (Event 7). Nevertheless, the results show that the differences 
between the excess returns of high risk and low risk investment banks are insignificant.  
Finally, Table 4 shows that size and/or risk variations are also evident in the excess returns of 
insurance companies. Specifically, only large and/or high risk insurers exhibit positive and 
significant excess returns when the Conference committee began the reconciliation process 
(Event 4). The difference in excess returns is, however, only significant for the risk 
segmentation. Nonetheless, the negative excess return observed in the full sample when the 
Conference report was passed/agreed to in the House (Event 5), is driven by small and/or low 
risk insurers. 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that large and/or risky banks will be more 
affected by the DFA, given their greater involvement in riskier activities. As noted earlier these 
activities are more likely to shift to investment banks. The results on the latter are consistent with 
this view, whilst highlighting that the largest investment banks might capture the bulk of this 
activity. The result on insurers also highlights that benefits (losses) will accrue to large/risky 
(small/less risky) companies. In particular, large insurers are more likely to gain from 
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concessions made on a ban of risky trading activities, while small and less risky insurers are 
more likely to be affected by compliance costs and the uncertainty regarding their post-DFA 
operations. 
4.2. Changes in risk 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the market risk coefficients
20
 and shifts in these estimates 
following the passage of the DFA. Columns 2 to 3 present the results for the full sample, 
columns 4 to 8 present estimates for high risk vs. low risk institutions, while columns 9 to 13 
present the results for large vs. small institutions.
21
  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
We begin by examining the market risk shifts reported in Panel A. The full sample results for 
national banks reveal a significant increase in their market risk following the passage of the 
DFA. Segmenting the sample into subsets reveals that this increase is only evidenced in low risk 
and/or small institutions. Moreover, the differences in risk shifts among institutions in each of 
the two subsets are statistically significant. Looking at state banks, the full sample results also 
document a significant increase in risk following the passage of the Act. Unlike national banks, 
both high risk and low risk state banks experience risk increases. Nevertheless, the size 
segmentation reveals that significant risk increases are only documented for small state banks, 
which exhibit significantly higher risk shift coefficients. Positive and significant risk shifts are 
also documented for savings institutions, the latter being driven by low risk institutions that 
                                                 
20
 In general, the changes in yield (interest rate shifts) do not seem to produce any significant results. This could be 
attributed to the low and stable interest rate environment and/or any balance sheet restructuring of the banking firms 
(mainly) to avoid exposure to duration and convexity mismatches. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the 
estimates of the interest rate coefficients and shifts in these estimates. These are available upon request. 
21
 Following from the previous section, we define large (small) institutions as those with total assets greater (lower) 
than $10 billion. For robustness, we also use the median value of total assets to segment the sample. Results remain 
largely consistent and are available upon request.  
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experience significantly higher risk shifts than their high risk peers. Unlike national banks, the 
size segmentation does not reveal any variations for savings institutions. Furthermore, the results 
show that finance companies do not experience any significant risk shifts. The only exception is 
the negative and significant risk shift coefficient for large finance companies – albeit, we need to 
be cautious in generalizing from this result as this subset contains only 3 firms. Shifting our 
attention to investment banks, we also observe a positive and significant increase in their market 
risk, which is consistent among high risk and low risk institutions. Nevertheless, the size 
segmentation reveals that only small investment banks experience risk increases. What’s more, 
their risk shift coefficient is significantly higher than the corresponding figure of large 
investment banks. Finally, insurance companies do not seem to experience any significant risk 
shifts following the passage of the DFA. Nonetheless, a closer look at the two subsets reveals 
significant risk increases for low risk and/or small insurers. 
For commercial banks, two opposing underlying forces are in place. On the one hand, one 
might reasonably expect commercial banks to exhibit lower systematic risk as a result of a 
gradual exodus from risky activities such as proprietary trading and ownership of hedge funds 
and private equity funds. Specifically, it can be argued that a return to more traditional banking 
activities should reduce the exposure of bank returns to the market. On the other hand, 
commercial banks are likely to experience an increase in their systematic risk due to investor 
uncertainty regarding a transfer of competitive strength to investment banks. This effect could be 
especially pronounced for smaller commercial banks, which could find themselves in a less 
favorable competitive position. The above results are consistent with the competitive strength of 
investment banks being the dominant force. The increase in the systematic exposure of 
investment banks is largely consistent with the view that their increased involvement in 
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securities activities and their greater exposure to hedge funds and private equity will render their 
returns more susceptible to wider market shocks. Nevertheless, the finding that only small 
investment banks experience significant increases in their market risk highlights the possibility 
that the DFA might be placing smaller investment banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
their larger peers when dealing with regulators. The insignificant shift in the market risk of 
insurance companies is somewhat expected as the DFA has limited coverage of insurers. 
Nevertheless, the fact that small and/or low risk insurers experience a significant market risk 
increase may reflect investor concerns regarding the future of smaller and/or riskier insurers. 
Compared to the literature, our results are somewhat consistent with Akhigbe et al. (2016). 
Specifically, whilst they report risk reductions for their full sample, they do find market beta 
increases for event windows up to 100 days following the DFA’s passage. In addition, as noted 
earlier, the aggregation of banks, securities and insurers could realize a loss of detail regarding 
sectoral differences.
22
 Overall, it is worth noting that the results raise concerns that the DFA may 
be inadequately addressing the issue of systematic risk, as suggested by the increased market risk 
for the majority of financial institutions. Even more so, the Act does not seem to enable the 
transferring of market risk from deposit taking institutions to investment banks. 
4.3. Cross-section analysis of excess returns 
This section employs a cross-section analysis to examine the relationship between wealth 
effects, market risk shift, and financial institution characteristics, such as institution type, 
profitability (ROE), leverage (LEV), growth opportunities (M/B), operating efficiency (CR), risk 
                                                 
22
 The aggregation issue is also present when their sample is split into depository (SIC 60) and non-depository 
institutions (SIC codes 62 and 63). SIC 60 includes, but is not limited to, Federal Reserve banks, central depository 
institutions, national banks, state banks, savings banks, credit unions, and foreign banks. These institutions as well 
as their operations are distinct enough to warrant different reactions to the DFA.  Similarly, the DFA has different 
provisions for investment banks and insurers. 
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(DD), and size. Table 6 presents the results of the cross-section analysis of excess returns. Panel 
A presents OLS regressions of excess returns from different dates during the DFA’s legislative 
process, while Panel B presents OLS regressions of the market risk shift coefficients. The first 
column identifies the independent variables, while each of the subsequent columns presents their 
coefficient estimates. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 1 (Panel A) presents OLS regressions of cumulative excess returns across all 
legislative events of the DFA. The first model indicates that all FIs except investment banks and 
life insurance companies experience significantly lower excess returns. Furthermore, the model 
suggests that FI characteristics, such as their profitability, growth opportunities, and size are not 
associated with excess returns. Nevertheless, the coefficients on leverage, operating efficiency 
and risk are negative and significant. This indicates that more levered, less operationally efficient 
(higher CR ratio), and riskier firms experience lower excess returns; these institutions are more 
likely to incur greater compliance costs in order to adapt to the DFA’s increased capital 
requirements and new leverage limits. Model 2 introduces size interactions with the type of 
financial institution. In this specification, the institutional dummies now account for small FIs 
(total assets < $10b). The coefficients on all small FIs are negative and significant, suggesting 
that small FIs experience lower excess returns. We also note that the coefficient on profitability 
is negative and significant, while the coefficient on growth opportunities is positive and 
significant. The above indicate that more profitable and higher-growth firms experience lower 
abnormal returns. One potential explanation is the fact that these firms tend to be involved in 
those activities mostly affected by the DFA. Shifting our attention to large FIs (L x institutional 
dummies), their coefficients can be interpreted as the incremental excess return over that of small 
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institutions within the same subset. In addition, the average abnormal return on large institutions 
within each subset can be determined by adding three coefficients: the intercept, the coefficient 
on small FIs, and the coefficient on large FIs. The results indicate the large national banks also 
experience lower excess returns, while their average excess return is -2.7% (1.8% - 2.6% - 
1.9%). The coefficients on large state banks, savings banks and P/C insurers are insignificant, 
indicating they do not experience higher or lower returns. In contrast, the coefficients on large 
investment banks, and large life and health insurers are positive and significant. The average 
abnormal return for large investment banks is 1.5% (1.8% - 4.1% + 3.8%). The corresponding 
average excess return for large life insurers is 1.7%. These results suggest that large investment 
banks and large life insurers benefit at the expense of their smaller counterparts. The result on 
large investment banks is consistent with the view that the Volcker Rule may improve their 
competitive position in proprietary trading activities, asset management as well as investments in 
private equity and hedge funds. As far as life insurers are concerned, the positive excess return 
could be related to the view that larger life insurers generally favoured the idea of Federal 
regulation. The corresponding average excess return for large health insurers is -0.8%, which 
implies the former were less harmed by the DFA than small health insurance companies. 
Models 3 and 4 (Panel A) present OLS regressions of cumulative excess returns for June 25, 
(Conference Committee begins reconciliation). The variable coefficients on Model 3 are 
generally consistent with those reported in Model 1. What’s more, the size dummy is negative 
and significant, indicating that larger (smaller) institutions experience lower (higher) excess 
returns. This confirms our previous finding (see Table 4) that the observed positive FI reaction 
on that date was generally driven by smaller FIs. Model 4 introduces large institution interactions 
and points to some interesting conclusions. First, the negative coefficients on small state and 
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savings banks, and small health and P/C insurers indicate these institutions experience lower 
abnormal returns. The size interactions reveal that large national banks and large investment 
banks experience lower returns than their smaller counterparts. This lends further support to the 
argument that any benefits associated with concessions made in the reconciled version of the Bill 
may have accrued to smaller FIs. 
Models 5 and 6 (Panel A) present OLS regressions of cumulative excess returns for July 15, 
(Conference report passed/agreed to in the Senate). The institutional dummies in Model 5 show 
that national banks, state banks, savings banks and life insurers experience lower abnormal 
returns. The coefficients on all accounting variables are insignificant, except for leverage that 
yields a negative and significant coefficient. As expected, more levered FIs experience lower 
abnormal returns, possibly reflecting market concerns that the Act will mostly affect those 
institutions. Complementing the findings in Table 4, the size dummy is positive and significant 
indicating that large FIs experience higher abnormal returns. The size interactions in Model 6 
show that large investment banks and large life insurers experience higher excess returns than 
their smaller peers. The average excess return on investment banks is 0.7% (-0.3% - 1.0% + 
2.0%), indicating that they experience positive excess returns. In contrast, large life insurers 
experience a negative average abnormal return of -0.6% (-0.3% -1.2% + 0.9%). 
Models 7 and 8 (Panel B) present OLS regressions of market risk shifts following the passage 
of the DFA. Consistent with our univariate results, Model 7 reveals that national banks, state 
banks, and investment banks experience higher risk increases. Even though none of the 
accounting variables are significant, the large institutions dummy is negative and significant, 
implying that large FIs experience significantly lower increases in risk. Model 7, which includes 
large institution interactions, points to some interesting conclusions. In particular, large national 
 29 
 
banks, state banks, investment banks, life and P/C insurers experience lower risk shifts than their 
smaller peers. This is consistent with the view that large FIs might gain from the DFA at the 
expense of their smaller counterparts.
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Overall the results indicate that the DFA might have redistributed value from banks and other 
financial institutions to investment banks and is consistent with the notion of value re-
distribution around de-regulatory events (Carow and Kane, 2002), due to changes in the 
competitive structure of the financial services industry. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The familiar sequence of financial crises and ensuing regulatory reforms is anything but new, 
and can be traced back to the Wall Street’s history of financial innovation (Hilt, 2009). Financial 
crises have been examined thoroughly in the academic literature, while the resemblance of crises 
to hurricanes (Bruner and Carr, 2007) has simplified the myth about crises’ individuality. Yet, 
regulatory failures are rarely discussed, since regulatory frameworks are reactive to financial 
crises rather than being proactive before the turmoil erupts. Revisiting the U.S. financial 
regulation history, one realises the cyclical pattern of regulating, deregulating and reregulating 
financial intermediaries (Gart, 1994). This process, fuelled by the weakness of policy makers to 
codify the understanding of regulatory failures and convey it over time, has been central to the 
financial intermediaries’ wealth and risk profile. 
Almost two decades ago, deregulation in the U.S. has enabled the formation of financial 
conglomerates or universal banks. The latter managed to diversify across products, generate 
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 We also perform a number of F-tests to examine if the coefficients across different groups of FIs are different. The 
majority of tests reveal significant differences among pairs of institutions of different sectors and size groups. To 
conserve space, these results are available upon request. 
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efficiencies at various fronts, accommodate clients’ needs, and offer social benefits to the society 
(Saunders, 1985). Nevertheless, the 2007 financial crisis has highlighted a number of regulatory 
failures in areas including, but not limited to, crisis management, regulatory discipline, capital 
adequacy, liquidity risk management, prompt corrective action, moral hazard, and the form of 
deposit insurance (Goodhart 2008). The consensus that banks’ securities activities were the main 
contributor to the crisis has dominated most post-crisis debates, thereby triggering a new cycle of 
reregulation. In 2010, the U.S. government introduced the DFA in order to alleviate systemic 
risk, end implicit guarantees and, promote better market discipline. A prominent question is 
whether the DFA will succeed in these objectives. Nonetheless, another question that is often 
overlooked is whether the Act will alter the industry’s competitive landscape, creating new 
winners and losers as FIs adapt to the new regulatory regime. 
This paper aims to shed some light into the above questions by looking into the wealth and 
risk effects of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act on the U.S. financial services industry. We 
measure the effects of key legislative events of the DFA Act by means of a multivariate 
regression model by employing the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. Our results 
indicate a mixed response by FIs during the various stages of the DFA’s legislative process. In 
particular, national banks, finance companies and insurance companies seem to welcome 
concessions made to the industry when the House and Senate Bills were reconciled. Nonetheless, 
this reaction is driven by small and/or low risk national banks, small finance firms, and large 
and/or high risk insurance companies. In contrast, the negative reaction by national banks, state 
banks and investment banks when the conference report was passed/agreed to in the Senate is 
independent of their size and/or risk profile. The only exception are investment banks, where 
negative excess returns are only experienced by small and/or high risk institutions. The analysis 
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of risk effects reveals positive and significant increases in the market risk of national and state 
banks, savings institutions, and investment banks following the passage of the DFA, with small 
and/or low risk institutions dominating this trend. The cross-section results corroborate and 
extend the above, showing that large institutions fare better than small ones and that large 
investment banks may have gained at the expense of other FIs. 
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the notion that the DFA redistributed wealth among 
FIs. Investor concerns about the reforms of the financial services industry represent the 
cornerstone of the current debate among policy makers and cross-continent regulatory bodies. 
Looking at the U.S. regulatory arena, one observes the unceasing struggle between regulators 
and regulatees, a process already known as regulatory dialectic (Kane, 1981, 1988). During this 
process the notion of regulatory arbitrage surfaces in today’s capital markets dominated by 
globalization and financial innovation. Given the structure of modern capital markets, the 
question raised is how to implant a pro-active device into the regulatory regime that foresees and 
reacts to financial innovation and regulatory avoidance. The continued interface among 
governments, lobbyists, and regulators shapes the structure of financial services industry, which 
in turn alters the statutory definition of financial intermediaries – predominantly banks. The 
danger in this process is the creation of partnership between financially important institutions 
and governments. Under this partnership, the former may enjoy various benefits (size, wealth, 
implicit government guarantees, etc.) while the latter may deploy these institutions as conduits of 
their own ambitions. Unbeknownst to them, such deals pave the way for the next economic 
crisis. 
This paper informs the debate on bank regulation and can be useful to regulators and 
managers in shaping the future path of the financial services industry. As more data becomes 
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available, future research could examine the impact of the DFA at the firm- or public policy-
levels. For example, future studies can look into the long-term effects of the Act on the FIs 
efficiency, profitability, and risk, or examine the Act’s impact on the level of systemic risk in the 
economy. 
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Table 1. 
Event Dates Leading up to the Passage Of Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
Event Number Event date Action 
1 December 2, 2009 Bill introduced in the House of Representatives 
2 December 11, 2009 Bill passed/agreed to in the House (H.RES.964) 
3 May 20, 2010 Bill passed/agreed to in the Senate (S.3217) 
4 June 25, 2010 Conference Committee began reconciliation 
5 June 30, 2010 Conference report passed/agreed to in the House 
6 July 12, 2010 Sign of enough votes in the Senate for approval 
7 July 15, 2010 Senate approved the bill 
8 July 21, 2010 President Obama signed the bill 
 This table presents the list of major events leading up to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Dates and 
information are sourced from the THOMAS database of the Library of Congress. Events 4 and 6 are not listed under 
major Congressional actions by the THOMAS database. However, we choose to include them as they might have 
conveyed information to the market regarding the details of the Act, and/or partially removed uncertainty regarding 
its passage. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics. 
 
 
National 
Banks 
State  
Banks 
Savings 
Banks 
Finance 
Companies 
Investment 
Banks 
Insurance 
Companies (All) 
Health 
Insurance 
Life 
Insurance 
P/C 
Insurance 
Sample Size 67 92 35 36 44 86 19 12 55 
Assets          
Mean 134,477.515 14,189.403 11,119.495 14,346.354 57,402.886 53,861.370 31,397.099 120,740.242 47,030.00 
Median 5,464.03 3,545.356 4,047.760 879.527 971.412 9,947.525 25,249.501 22,949.102 7,666.694 
S.D. 445,627.94 35,081.593 15,614.295 40,953.139 188,876.137 128,386.387 35,414.812 189,121.481 130,470.664 
ROE          
Mean -0.002 -0.097 -0.084 0.356 0.051 0.101 0.109 0.016 0.116 
Median 0.039 0.050 0.022 0.102 0.052 0.103 0.105 0.049 0.113 
S.D. 0.187 0.586 0.314 2.037 0.203 0.087 0.066 0.115 0.077 
LEV          
Mean 9.801 11.866 10.116 10.387 3.651 5.529 4.834 13.575 4.014 
Median 9.662 10.286 8.259 2.448 2.064 3.613 3.066 15.633 3.410 
S.D. 1.885 9.402 6.486 22.033 3.733 5.186 4.753 7.625 2.462 
CR          
Mean 0.032 0.031 0.026 0.125 0.366 0.055 0.211 0.002 0.010 
Median 0.029 0.029 0.025 0.080 0.322 0.002 0.169 0.000 0.001 
S.D. 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.165 0.263 0.146 0.252 0.003 0.019 
M/B          
Mean 1.091 1.103 0.953 1.042 4.471 0.968 1.110 0.758 0.967 
Median 1.115 1.085 0.973 0.866 2.222 0.900 1.090 0.670 0.893 
S.D. 0.537 0.791 0.288 0.722 10.308 0.464 0.733 0.329 0.351 
DD          
Mean 0.048 0.082 0.035 0.087 0.061 0.044 0.042 0.079 0.037 
Median 0.035 0.037 0.029 0.067 0.050 0.036 0.030 0.075 0.032 
S.D. 0.035 0.144 0.015 0.053 0.044 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.023 
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of financial institutions. Assets are expressed in USD millions.  ROE is the return on equity, calculated as the ratio of net 
income-to-total equity. LEV is the ratio of total assets-to-total equity, known as the equity multiplier. CR is the ratio of operating expenses-to-total assets. M/B is the market-to-
book ratio. DD is the 5-year default probability measure provided by the Bloomberg credit risk function (see fn. 14). We source all variables from Bloomberg at the 2009 fiscal 
year-end, except for DD, where the December 2009 figure is used. 
Note: S.D. represents the standard deviation. 
  
 40 
 
Table 3. 
SUR results by industry type: Full sample. 
 
  Event 1: 2 December 2009 Event 2: 11 December 2009 Event 3: 20 May 2010 Event 4: 25 June 2010 
 N 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 
                  
National banks 67 -0.007 1.409 19 -3.543a -0.003 0.293 19 -3.543a -0.004 0.533 21 -3.054a 0.012 4.507b 63 7.208a 
State banks 92 -0.004 0.635 22 -5.004a -0.003 0.227 41 -1.043 -0.005 0.823 27 -3.962a 0.004 0.594 76 6.255a 
Savings institutions 35 -0.003 0.433 12 -1.859b -0.002 0.272 11 -2.197b -0.009 3.943b 4 -4.564a 0.003 0.316 24 2.197b 
Finance companies 36 0.000 0.000 11 -2.333b -0.001 0.037 17 -0.333 -0.004 0.712 12 -2.000b 0.009 4.382b 28 3.333a 
Investment banks 44 -0.005 1.798 11 -3.317a -0.004 1.431 10 -3.618a -0.003 0.501 22 0.000 0.006 2.388 33 3.317a 
Insurance companies 86 -0.005 2.538 21 -4.745a 0.002 0.482 56 2.804a -0.005 2.396 18 -5.392a 0.005 2.865c 68 5.392a 
                  
  Event 5: 30 June 2010 Event 6: 12 July 2010 Event 7: 15 July 2010 Event 8: 21 July 2010 
 N 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝜒
2-stat +ve z-stat 
                  
National banks 67 -0.006 1.046 14 -4.765a 0.006 1.108 51 4.276a -0.015 6.772a 4 -7.208a -0.004 0.394 26 -1.833b 
State banks 92 -0.004 0.616 33 -2.711a 0.005 0.766 75 6.047a -0.014 6.321a 7 -8.132a -0.002 0.140 37 -1.877b 
Savings institutions 35 -0.001 0.054 17 -0.169 0.004 0.738 24 2.197b -0.005 1.162 7 -3.550a -0.004 0.560 14 -1.183 
Finance companies 36 -0.003 0.374 13 -1.667b 0.004 0.774 28 3.333a -0.005 1.473 7 -3.667a -0.007 2.282 13 -1.667b 
Investment banks 44 -0.009 6.228b 10 -3.618a 0.005 2.004 35 3.920a -0.006 3.081c 10 -3.618a 0.001 0.025 24 0.603 
Insurance companies 86 -0.006 3.675c 14 -6.254a 0.001 0.025 49 1.294 -0.005 2.473 17 -5.607a -0.002 0.367 33 -2.157b 
                  
                  
This table presents the excess returns of financial institutions on key legislative events leading up to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Abnormal returns are estimated using 
equation (1) where the effect of each legislative event is captured by a dummy variable that equals one on the three trading days around the 𝑘𝑡ℎ regulatory event [-1, +1], and zero 
otherwise. On December 2, 2009 the Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. On December 11, 2009 the Bill was passed/agreed to in the House of Representatives. On 
May 20, 2010 the Bill was passed/agreed to in the Senate. On June 25, 2010 the Conference Committee began reconciliation of the House and Senate versions. On June 30, 2010 the 
conference report was passed/agreed to in the House of Representatives. On July 12, 2010 Senator Scott Brown backed the Bill. On July 15, 2010 the Conference Report was agreed 
to in Senate, cleared for White House and presented to the President. On July 21, 2010 President Barack Obama signed the Bill. Note: On June 29, 2010 the House-Senate conference 
committee finalized negotiations and filed the conference report to accompany the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
𝑁 is the total number of institutions within each group. The 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ figures represent the average abnormal return per event 𝑘 and averaged across each category of firms. The 𝜒
2-stat is 
derived from a Wald coefficient restrictions test; the null hypothesis is,  ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑘 = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where, 𝑖 is the financial institution within each group, and 𝑘 the event. +𝑣𝑒 shows the number 
of positive abnormal returns per event within each group. The z-statistic (z-stat) is calculated as, (𝑉 − 𝑁𝑝) √𝑁𝑝(1 − 𝑝)⁄ , where, 𝑉 is the number of positive parameter estimates, 𝑁 is 
the number of parameter estimates, and 𝑝 = 0.50 the probability of a positive estimate. a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. 
SUR results by industry type: Sample subsets. 
 
  Event 1: 2 December 2009 Event 4: 25 June 2010 Event 7: 15 July 2010 Event 8: 21 July 2010 
Panel A: Large vs. Small LA  S LA-S LA  S LA-S LA  S LA-S LA  S LA-S 
 𝑁𝐿𝐴/𝑁𝑆 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 
              
National banks 
24/43 
-0.015 -0.002 -0.013 0.009 0.014 -0.005 -0.013 -0.016 0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 
𝜒2-stat 4.840b 0.119 (-4.924)a 1.715 5.078
b (-2.104)b 3.677c 6.592b (1.114) 0.917 0.097 (-1.322) 
State banks 
20/71 
-0.010 -0.003 -0.007 0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 0.004 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 
𝜒2-stat 1.805 0.263 (-2.295)b 1.225 0.749 (-0.668) 1.814 6.452
b (2.022)b 0.385 0.007 (-2.665)b 
Savings institutions 
8/18 
-0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011 -0.003 -0.008 
𝜒2-stat 0.716 0.093 (-1.192) 0.370 0.143 (0.500) 0.531 0.521 (-0.144) 2.842
c 0.307 (-1.474) 
Finance companies 
3/22 
-0.007 0.004 -0.011 0.006 0.009 -0.003 -0.012 -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 -0.009 -0.004 
𝜒2-stat 0.756 0.495 (-0.775) 0.551 3.074c (-0.503) 2.011 0.598 (-2.419)c 2.413 3.354c (-0.272) 
Investment banks 
8/28 
-0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.006 -0.011 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.000 
𝜒2-stat 2.038 0.840 (-0.598) 1.776 1.604 (0.216) 1.590 6.335b (3.490)a 0.176 0.234 (-0.050) 
Insurance companies 
43/43 
-0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
𝜒2-stat 2.674 1.283 (-0.872) 2.957c 1.490 (0.941) 1.597 2.149 (0.483) 0.118 0.499 (0.667) 
              
  Event 1: 2 December 2009 Event 4: 25 June 2010 Event 7: 15 July 2010 Event 8: 21 July 2010 
Panel B: High vs. low risk H  LO H-LO H  LO H-LO H  LO H-LO H  LO H-LO 
 𝑁𝐻/𝑁𝐿𝑂 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ 
              
National banks 
33/34 
-0.010 -0.004 -0.007 0.011 0.014 -0.003 -0.017 -0.013 -0.004 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 
𝜒2-stat 2.142 0.498 (-2.209)
b 2.398 7.392a (-0.954) 5.946
b 6.741a (-1.612) 1.033 0.002 (-1.740)c 
State banks 
45/46 
-0.002 -0.007 0.006 -0.002 0.010 -0.012 -0.017 -0.012 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
𝜒2-stat 0.065 1.967 (1.982)
c 0.067 3.799c (-2.457)
b 6.371b 5.005b (-2.214)b 0.031 0.299 (0.544) 
Savings institutions 
13/13 
-0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 
𝜒2-stat 0.190 0.410 (-0.085) 0.192 0.295 (0.175) 0.116 2.040 (0.878) 0.598 1.773 (0.077) 
Finance companies 
12/12 
0.010 -0.004 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.002 -0.003 -0.007 0.004 -0.001 -0.019 0.018 
𝜒2-stat 2.596 0.793 (1.041) 2.412 2.647 (0.479) 0.224 1.946 (1.191) 0.024 16.315a (0.977) 
Investment banks 
18/18 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 
𝜒2-stat 1.130 0.951 (-0.433) 2.140 1.051 (0.924) 3.308c 1.929 (-0.844) 0.366 0.083 (0.443) 
Insurance companies 
43/43 
-0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
𝜒2-stat 1.389 3.076c (0.271) 4.626b 0.445 (3.783)a 1.793 2.241 (-0.544) 0.172 0.504 (0.238) 
              
              
This table presents the excess returns of, and differences between sample subsets on key legislative events leading up to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Panel A presents results for 
large (LA – total assets > $10b) and small (S – total assets < $10b) financial institutions, while Panel B presents results for high risk (H – above median DD) and low risk (LO – below 
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median DD) financial institutions. Abnormal returns are estimated using equation (1) where the effect of each legislative event is captured by a dummy variable that equals one on the 
three trading days around the 𝑘𝑡ℎ regulatory event [-1, +1], and zero otherwise.  On December 2, 2009 the Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. On June 25, 2010 the 
Conference Committee began reconciliation of the House and Senate versions. On July 15, 2010 the Conference Report was agreed to in Senate, cleared for White House and presented 
to the President. On July 21, 2010 President Barack Obama signed the Bill. 
𝑁𝐿𝐴, 𝑁𝑆, 𝑁𝐻, and 𝑁𝐿𝑂 represent the total number of large, small, high risk, and low risk institutions within each group, respectively. The 𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ figures represent the average abnormal return 
per event 𝑘 and averaged across each category of firms and size profile. ∆𝛿𝑘̅̅ ̅ is the difference between the excess returns of large and small institutions (LA-S), or high risk and low risk 
institutions (H-LO). The 𝜒2-stat is derived from a Wald coefficient restrictions test; the null hypothesis is,  ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑘 = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where, 𝑖 is the financial institution within each group, and 𝑘 the 
event. Figures in parentheses show t-values. a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. 
Risk shifts following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
            Full Sample High Risk Low Risk High-Low Large Small Large-Small 
Market risk 
Before 
(?̅?) 
Shift 
(?̅?) 
Before 
(?̅?) 
Shift 
(?̅?) 
Before 
(?̅?) 
Shift 
(?̅?) 
ΔShift 
Δ(?̅?) 
Before 
(?̅?) 
Shift 
(?̅?) 
Before 
(?̅?) 
Shift 
(?̅?) 
ΔShift 
Δ(?̅?) 
             
National banks 1.091 0.216 1.235 0.141 0.950 0.290 -0.150 1.208 0.119 1.025 0.271 -0.153 
𝜒2-stat 416.753a 3.659c 361.454a 1.043 421.410a 8.759a (-1.933)c 353.283a 0.757 316.976a 4.945b (-2.339)b 
State banks 0.990 0.287 1.098 0.256 0.887 0.330 -0.074 1.186 0.124 0.939 0.339 -0.214 
𝜒2-stat 374.487a 6.983a 322.817a 3.913b 347.204a 10.695a (-0.918) 385.668a 0.943 292.994a 8.490a (-2.001)c 
Savings institutions 0.866 0.168 1.096 0.025 0.757 0.159 -0.134 0.943 0.144 0.920 0.069 0.075 
𝜒2-stat 381.916a 3.201c 273.410a 0.032 338.212a 3.341a (-0.771) 224.351a 1.165 298.925a 0.378 (0.517) 
Finance companies 1.088 0.048 1.182 0.131 1.069 -0.045 0.176 1.478 -0.395 1.017 0.127 -0.523 
𝜒2-stat 676.570a 0.294 401.321a 1.106 583.131a 0.227 (1.082) 368.135a 5.872b 485.214a 1.695 (-2.215) 
Investment banks 1.112 0.223 1.174 0.227 1.008 0.268 -0.041 1.105 -0.043 1.087 0.331 -0.373 
𝜒2-stat 1055.028a 9.435a 688.750a 5.760a 804.611a 12.676a (-0.284) 716.156a 0.239 765.225a 15.786a (-3.684)a 
Insurance companies 0.961 0.069 1.238 -0.057 0.685 0.195 -0.253 1.122 -0.029 0.801 0.167 -0.197 
𝜒2-stat 1030.649a 1.189 1048.814a 0.499 568.539a 10.329a (-4.824)a 1064.400a 0.160 535.865a 5.222b (-3.564)a 
             
This table presents the market risk (?̅?) and market risk shift (?̅?) coefficients estimated using equation (1). The risk shift is captured by the coefficient (?̅?) on a dummy variable that 
equals one on all trading days following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (July 21, 2010), and zero otherwise. Results are presented for the full sample (columns 2 to 3), high risk 
vs. low risk institutions (above or below median DD – columns 4 to 7), and large vs. small institutions (above or below $10 billion total assets – columns 9 to 12). Columns 8 and 13 
present the differences between the respective subsets. 
The (?̅?), (?̅?), and (?̅?) figures represent averages across each category of firms. The 𝜒2-stat is derived from a Wald coefficient restrictions test; the null hypothesis is,  ∑ 𝑋𝑖 = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
where, 𝑖 is the financial institution within each group, and X the coefficient being tested 𝛽, 𝛾, or 𝜃. Figures in parentheses show t-values. a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6. 
Cross section analysis of abnormal returns and market risk shifts. 
 
     
 
Panel A: Excess Returns 
Panel B: Market 
Risk 
 All Events Event 4: June 25 Event 7: July 15 Post DFA Shift 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Constant (Finance 
companies) 
0.019 0.018 0.016 0.016 -0.003 -0.003 0.096 0.078 
 (1.781)c (1.863)c (5.770)a (5.497)a -(1.685)c -(1.617) (1.206) (0.943) 
National Banks -0.036 -0.026 -0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.011 0.233 0.239 
 -(3.143)a -(2.212)b -(1.362) -(0.894) -(4.123)a -(3.614)a (2.384)b (2.132)b 
State Banks -0.033 -0.025 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.291 0.318 
 -(2.971)a -(2.339)b -(3.124)a -(2.638)a -(3.639)a -(3.457)a (2.979)a (3.084)a 
Savings Banks -0.039 -0.029 -0.015 -0.016 0.000 0.001 0.107 0.039 
 -(2.748)a -(2.101)b -(4.215)a -(3.906)a -(0.113) (0.340) (0.831) (0.247) 
Investment Banks -0.022 -0.041 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.010 0.211 0.315 
 -(1.544) -(2.472)b -(1.250) -(0.499) -(1.121) -(3.177)a (1.803)c (2.062)b 
Life Insurance -0.010 -0.037 0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.012 -0.070 0.150 
 -(0.700) -(2.650)a (0.822) (2.221)b -(2.469)b -(5.202)a -(0.637) (1.534) 
Health Insurance -0.037 -0.071 -0.009 -0.011 0.002 0.006 0.088 0.141 
 -(2.824)a -(3.634)a -(2.447)b -(2.070)b (0.730) (1.434) (0.808) (0.870) 
P/C Insurance -0.028 -0.027 -0.011 -0.012 -0.003 -0.002 0.109 0.087 
 -(2.745)a -(2.710)a -(4.162)a -(4.054)a -(1.240) -(1.036) (1.218) (0.911) 
ROE -0.032 -0.037 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.086 -0.082 
 -(1.515) -(1.874)c -(0.699) -(0.742) (1.259) (1.258) -(0.583) -(0.519) 
LEV -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 
 -(1.732)c -(2.543)b -(0.697) -(0.712) -(1.661)c -(2.229)b -(1.219) -(1.114) 
M/B 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 
 (1.507) (2.564)a (0.937) (0.489) (0.999) (1.911)c -(0.666) -(1.146) 
CR -0.048 -0.006 -0.026 -0.027 -0.002 0.005 0.019 -0.115 
 -(1.723)c -(0.201) -(3.349)a -(2.819)a -(0.221) (0.716) (0.063) -(0.339) 
DD -0.191 -0.184 -0.107 -0.107 -0.013 -0.011 0.202 0.214 
 -(2.318)b -(2.320)b -(3.721)a -(3.703)a -(0.744) -(0.637) (0.399) (0.410) 
L -0.005  -0.004  0.003  -0.175  
 -(1.149)  -(2.544)
b  (2.531)b  -(3.952)a  
L x National Banks  -0.019  -0.005  0.003  -0.153 
  -(2.355)b  -(2.027)b  (1.053)  -(2.182)b 
L x State Banks  -0.016  -0.005  0.003  -0.229 
  -(1.437)  -(1.354)  (1.485)  -(2.072)b 
L x Savings Banks  -0.018  0.001  0.000  0.075 
  -(1.031)  (0.273)  -(0.048)  (0.497) 
L x Investment Banks  0.038  -0.008  0.020  -0.385 
  (2.384)b  -(1.719)c  (3.840)a  -(2.469)b 
L x Life Insurance  0.036  -0.008  0.009  -0.423 
  (1.997)b  -(1.578)  (3.409)a  -(4.458)a 
L x Health Insurance  0.045  0.001  -0.005  -0.204 
  (2.489)b  (0.173)  -(1.135)  -(1.267) 
L x P/C Insurance  0.004  0.000  0.003  -0.095 
  (0.988)  (0.016)  (1.905)c  -(1.713)c 
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.193 0.224 0.306 0.298 0.204 0.244 0.121 0.117 
F-statistic 6.874 5.835 11.801 8.122 7.270 6.411 4.376 3.221 
This table presents OLS regressions of excess returns (Panel A) and market risk shifts (Panel B) of financial institutions on a 
number of exogenous factors captured by various accounting and dummy variables. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is 
the cumulative excess return across all legislative events of the DFA. The dependent variable in models 3 and 4 is the estimated 
excess return for June 25 (Conference Committee began the reconciliation process). The dependent variable in models 5 and 6 is 
the estimated excess return for July 15 (Conference report passed/agreed to in the Senate). The dependent variable in models 7 
and 8 is the estimated market risk shift coefficient. The first column identifies the independent variables, while each of the 
subsequent columns present the OLS coefficient estimates. National Banks, State Banks, Savings Banks, Investment Banks, 
Health Insurance, Life Insurance, and P/C Insurance are dummy variables capturing the type of institution. ROE is the return on 
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equity, calculated as the ratio of net income-to-total equity. LEV is the ratio of total assets-to-total equity, known as the equity 
multiplier. M/B is the market-to-book ratio. CR is the ratio of operating expenses-to-total assets. DD is the 5-year default 
probability measure provided by the Bloomberg credit risk function (see fn. 14). Large is a dummy variable equal to one for 
financial institutions with total assets greater than USD 10 billion and zero otherwise. In cases where independent variables are 
correlated with one another, we use auxiliary regressions to make them orthogonal. We source all variables from Bloomberg at 
the 2009 fiscal year-end, except for DD, where the December 2009 figure is used. 
Figures in brackets are t-values (White errors). a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
